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Metaphorical expressions very often involve words referring to physical entities and
experiences. Yet, figures of speech such as metaphors are not intended to be understood
literally, word-by-word. We used event-related brain potentials (ERPs) to determine
whether metaphorical expressions are processed more like physical or more like abstract
expressions. To this end, novel adjective-noun word pairs were presented visually in three
conditions: (1) Physical, easy to experience with the senses (e.g., “printed schedule”);
(2) Abstract, difficult to experience with the senses (e.g., “conditional schedule”); and
(3) novel Metaphorical, expressions with a physical adjective, but a figurative meaning
(e.g., “thin schedule”). We replicated the N400 lexical concreteness effect for concrete vs.
abstract adjectives. In order to increase the sensitivity of the concreteness manipulation
on the expressions, we divided each condition into high and low groups according to
rated concreteness. Mirroring the adjective result, we observed a N400 concreteness
effect at the noun for physical expressions with high concreteness ratings vs. abstract
expressions with low concreteness ratings, even though the nouns per se did not differ
in lexical concreteness. Paradoxically, the N400 to nouns in the metaphorical expressions
was indistinguishable from that to nouns in the literal abstract expressions, but only for
the more concrete subgroup of metaphors; the N400 to the less concrete subgroup of
metaphors patterned with that to nouns in the literal concrete expressions. In sum, we not
only find evidence for conceptual concreteness separable from lexical concreteness but
also that the processing of metaphorical expressions is not driven strictly by either lexical
or conceptual concreteness.
Keywords: metaphor, figurative language, ERPs, N400, concreteness effect, abstract-concrete, novel expressions
INTRODUCTION
Metaphors are pervasive in everyday language, arguably being
much more than mere rhetorical or poetic tools, possibly even
serving as key instruments of linguistic change and innovation
(Bréal, 1900). The high frequency of metaphors in natural
language is taken by some to reflect the underlying metaphorical
nature of the conceptual system. In their cognitive metaphor
theory, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) propose that abstract target
domains (e.g., mind) are structured and grounded via systematic
mappings from concrete source domains (e.g., containers),
thereby establishing conceptual metaphors (THE MIND IS A
CONTAINER) which support everyday metaphorical expressions
(e.g., “He couldn’t get the movie out of his head”). The term
that refers to the source domain is also called the vehicle,
the proposition that is stated about the topic term that in
turn refers to the concept of the target domain. Even though
the source domains are concrete, they are not intended for
literal interpretation. For instance, the expressions “thick book”
and “steamy book” are both noun phrases comprising an
adjective evoking a physical property, followed by a noun.
In the first case, the expression as a whole is understood
literally, as an object with the physical property of thickness. In
contrast, “steamy book” is not understood literally as a tome
emitting steam but rather figuratively as a salacious romantic
novel.
Embodied cognition (e.g., Lakoff and Johnson, 1999),
however, argues the opposite, namely that metaphors
are understood via the parallel co-activation of neural
structures representing and/or processing physical properties
(i.e., “steaminess” in the above example). Consistent with
this hypothesis, Desai et al. (2011) found that metaphorical
sentences involving physical motion (“The public grasped
the idea”) were associated with fMRI activations of the left
anterior inferior parietal lobe, a secondary sensorimotor area,
just like sentences involving literal physical motion (“The girl
grasped the flowers”). Moreover, since metaphors activated
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the left middle superior temporal sulcus similarly to abstract
paraphrases (“The public understood the idea”), both an
abstract and physical component are implicated. Less strict
theories of embodied language processing (e.g., Binder and
Desai, 2011) suggest that only novel expressions activate
sensorimotor regions, and familiar expressions and/or familiar
contexts rely on more abstract representations. This proposal
resonates with language processing models such as the
graded salience hypothesis (Giora, 1997, 2003) or the coarse
semantic coding theory (Beeman, 1998; Jung-Beeman, 2005)
that predict different processes for novel expressions (i.e.,
by the right hemisphere), regardless of figurativeness, and
for conventional expressions (i.e., by the left hemisphere)
as a result of their salient meaning and/or high degree of
association. These potential differences between comprehension
of conventional and novel metaphors fall outside the scope of
the current inquiry, since we focus solely on relatively novel
expressions.
Our aim in this report is to better understand the role that
physical (or concrete, as we will also refer to them) properties
of individual words (adjectives) and/or concepts (expressed by
adjective-noun pairs) play in novel metaphor comprehension in
real-time. To that end, we employ an online methodology that
permits moment-by-moment examination of the metamorphosis
from concrete, literal language into metaphorical, emergent
concepts. Specifically, we recorded event-related brain potentials
(ERPs)—a method enabling not just quantitative, but also
qualitative, comparisons of the neural processing related to
linguistic phenomena as they unfold in time.
ERP studies of metaphor processing are often centered
on the N400 ERP component. The visual N400 (Kutas and
Hillyard, 1980) is a negative-going centroparietally maximal ERP
component peaking approximately 400 ms after stimulus onset,
sensitive to the ease or difficulty of semantic memory access (for
a review, see Kutas and Federmeier, 2011). Although the N400 is
sensitive to a wide variety of factors that vary at the single-word
level (e.g., concreteness, frequency, orthographic neighborhood
size, repetition), the effects of top-down contextual information
generally outweigh those of bottom-up information.
Several ERP studies have reported larger N400s to words
appearing in metaphorical (e.g., “power is a strong intoxicant”) vs.
literal (“whiskey is a strong intoxicant”) expressions (e.g., Pynte
et al., 1996; Coulson and Van Petten, 2002, 2007; Tartter et al.,
2002; Arzouan et al., 2007; Lai et al., 2009; Lai and Curran, 2013);
overall, however, results have been inconsistent. Conventional
metaphors (e.g., “broken heart”) have a fixed figurative meaning,
and might be stored as lexical units (Jackendoff, 1997). Perhaps
as a consequence they have been found to be processed
faster and more accurately than novel metaphors (e.g., “rusty
moves”), for which figurative meaning needs to be computed
on-line (e.g., Faust and Mashal, 2007; Forgács et al., 2014).
Investigations of novel metaphors, however, differ considerably
in their details. Pynte et al. (1996), for example, modified the
topics of conventional metaphors (“fighters” in “Those fighters
are lions”), not the vehicles (“lions”) that carry the figurative
meaning; in Tartter et al. (2002), sentence final words were not
identical across conditions, leading to differences in frequency
and cloze probability; (Coulson and Van Petten, 2002, 2007)
controlled for the cloze probability of sentence final words,
but not for the novelty and complexity of the expressions
themselves (for further concerns with their stimuli see Lai et al.,
2009).
Lai et al. (2009) carried out a well-controlled study, using
a mixture of noun-, adjective- and verb-based metaphors
in sentences of varying complexity. They showed that
while conventional and novel metaphors both elicited larger
amplitude negativities relative to literal sentences early in the
N400 time window (320–440 ms), processing of conventional
metaphors converged with that of the literal sentences, whereas
novel metaphors continued to be treated more like anomalous
sentences. They attributed the sustained negativity (between
440–560 ms) elicited by novel metaphors to semantic integration
processes.
Figurative language also has been studied using semantically
linked word pairs that constitute relatively minimal linguistic
contexts. Arzouan et al. (2007) compared literal, conventional
metaphoric, novel metaphoric, and unrelated two-word
expressions by manipulating the first word while matching
the second word on several psycholinguistic measures. They
found that the N400 to the second word monotonically
increased from literal, to conventional metaphorical, to novel
metaphorical, to unrelated pairs. They also found differences in
scalp topography and timing that suggest qualitative differences
between the processing of conventional and novel metaphorical
expressions; specifically they suggested that a late negative
wave (between 550–880 ms) reflects secondary semantic
integration, specific to novel metaphors. However, when novel
metaphors are compared to conventional literal expressions
or to sentences, novelty and figurativeness are confounded;
hence the source of the effect is not clear. Comparing novel
metaphors to conventional metaphors is not an optimal
solution; firstly because it is, in essence, a manipulation of
language conventionality; and secondly, and perhaps more
importantly, there might be different processes involved in
comprehending the two (cf., Bowdle and Gentner, 2005; Forgács
et al., 2012). Together, these studies demonstrate, nevertheless,
that metaphoricity influences real time language processing
within the same time window (i.e., 200–900 ms post stimulus
onset) as many other semantic factors (Kutas and Federmeier,
2011).
The N400 time window of the ERP is likewise sensitive to
the concrete-abstract dimension of words, which might play
a key role in the creation and comprehension of metaphors,
which often involve mapping between an abstract (target) and
a more concrete (source) concept. After controlling for potential
confounding factors between concrete and abstract words, recent
work shows behavioral processing advantages for abstract words
(Kousta et al., 2011; Barber et al., 2013). ERP studies also
indicate rapid differential processing of concrete and abstract
words by about 300 ms post stimulus onset (e.g., Kounios
and Holcomb, 1994; Holcomb et al., 1999; West and Holcomb,
2000; Lee and Federmeier, 2008; Barber et al., 2013; for a
summary see Kutas et al., 2006). ERP concreteness effects are
typically characterized as greater negativity to concrete words
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relative to abstract words starting within the N400 time window.
These differences sometimes extend into a later time window
(500–800 ms), where they typically exhibit more anterior,
and more right lateralized, scalp topographies (e.g., West and
Holcomb, 2000). These potentially separable electrophysiological
constituents of the concreteness effect are consistent with Paivio
(2007) dual coding theory, under which there are two semantic
systems: a linguistic one that encodes both abstract and concrete
words, and a non-verbal imagistic system that encodes only
concrete words. On this theory, concrete words enjoy a processing
advantage because they activate dual representations and tap
into neural resources in both the linguistic and imagistic
systems.
Concreteness effects have been observed in weakly
constraining sentence contexts (e.g., West and Holcomb,
2000), as well as in single word contexts. Swaab et al. (2002)
presented abstract and concrete words following (un)related
prime words, and observed canonical N400 priming effects
(larger amplitude N400s to words preceded by unrelated
relative to related word primes) for both concrete and abstract
words. However, they also found topographic differences
between the abstract and concrete words, and an enhanced
frontal negativity for concrete words, regardless of prime
relatedness, consistent with structural and/or qualitative
processing differences. It appears that in contrast to sentential
contexts that eliminate topographic differences (Holcomb et al.,
1999), single word contexts do not suffice to override qualitative
ERP concreteness effects. Nonetheless, it seems that context
also may have some bearing on the elicitation of concreteness
effects.
Whereas minimal context ERP studies have typically
manipulated concreteness by presenting different sets of
concrete and abstract words that thus could differ on any
number of other factors, Huang et al. (2010) cleverly relied
on different adjective-same noun combinations to manipulate
whether a given noun was modified in a concrete or abstract
fashion. They conducted a divided visual field ERP study in
which polysemous nouns (e.g., “book”) were presented in
the left and right visual fields (LVF, RVF), modified either
by abstract adjectives (“interesting”) or concrete adjectives
(“thick”). Following flashes to the RVF (left hemisphere),
concretely modified nouns (“thick book”) evoked reduced N400s
(300–500 ms) relative to abstractly modified nouns (“interesting
book”); this is the reverse of the canonical ERP concreteness
effect. The authors suggested that concrete adjectives (which
themselves evoked the canonical concreteness effect) established
a more constraining context than abstract adjectives, and the
resulting increased expectancy led to reduced N400s. Following
LVF (right hemisphere) presentation, concrete (vs. abstract)
expressions evoked a sustained negativity over frontal electrode
sites only in a later 500–900 ms time window, consistent with
previously reported qualitative processing dissociations, and
therefore with some versions of the dual-coding theory. Based
on the results of the two-word studies of Swaab et al. (2002)
and Huang et al. (2010), the canonical (context-driven) N400
expectancy effect observed in published metaphor studies
might be independent of the lexical concreteness effect seen
in the same window, as the two effects seem to go in opposite
directions.
To sum up, metaphorical expressions very often rely on
physical expressions denoting concrete source domains to
describe abstract target domains. Whereas figurative meaning
clearly goes beyond the sum of its parts (i.e., the physical
senses of constituent words), it is less clear to what extent
(and when) the physical senses of constituent concrete words
impact immediate processing of metaphorical expressions.
Electrophysiological studies of metaphor processing generally
show smaller amplitude N400s to literal relative to metaphorical
expressions. In contrast, electrophysiological studies with
centrally presented single words or expressions typically
report a greater negativity within the N400 time window
(and sometimes beyond) to more concrete relative to more
abstract words. Against this background literature, we set out to
assess whether metaphorical expressions created by combining
physical adjectives that do not literally modify nouns (e.g., “sticky
meeting”) are processed more like concrete or abstract adjective-
noun expressions.
We adopted the word pair paradigm of Huang et al. (2010)
in which different adjectives are combined with the same noun
to rule out any potential lexical differences between target
stimuli. Given that familiarity can mediate between concreteness
and context effects (Levy-Drori and Henik, 2006), we limited
our exploration to novel metaphorical adjective-noun word
pairs, thereby ruling out conventional metaphors that might be
stored in the lexicon, and thus invoke different processing. We
compared and contrasted the following conditions, for which
individual stimulus items were formed by combining three
different adjectives with the same noun: (1) Abstract Literal (AL)
expressions which were comprised of an abstract adjective +
noun (e.g., “conditional schedule”); (2) Concrete Literal (CL)
expressions which were comprised of a concrete adjective +
noun (e.g., “printed schedule”); and (3) Metaphorical (MET)
expressions which were comprised of a different concrete adjective
+ noun (e.g., “thin schedule”) that were likely to be interpreted
metaphorically as they could not sensibly be interpreted literally
(See Table 1 for additional representative stimuli).
Table 1 | Example stimuli.
Metaphorical Concrete Abstract
(MET) literal (CL) literal (AL)
adjective adjective adjective Noun
Fluffy Nasal Ineffective Speech
Sticky Loud Constructive Meeting
Stale Scary Comprehensive Movie
Velvety Hot Protected Lake
Magnetic Slimy Intelligent Brain
Buzzing Lively Diligent Receptionist
Gutted Lush Mystical Forest
Fragile Sloped Unknown Path
Wounded Salty Radioactive Earth
Dripping Soprano Symbolic Tone
Rusty Painful Improvised Moves
Sparkling Luxurious Illegal Party
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At issue was whether processing of MET expressions would be
driven (1) by the concrete (physical) nature of the adjective (e.g.,
“thin”)—in which case ERPs to the MET nouns would mimic
those to the CL nouns; (2) by the non-literal abstract nature
of the noun phrases—in which case ERPs to the MET nouns
would mimic those to the AL nouns; or (3) by the non-literal,
metaphorical nature of the noun phrase interpretation (e.g., “thin
schedule”)—in which case ERPs to the MET nouns would differ
from those to both the CL and AL nouns, eliciting the largest
N400 and/or late negativity as in most ERP studies of novel
metaphors.
We consider several potential outcomes in the N400 window
(300–500 ms) of the adjective as well as the noun. We will first
inspect the ERPs elicited by the adjectives to obtain a lexical
concreteness effect baseline. We expect to see larger N400s to
concrete adjectives (easily experienced with the senses) in both
the CL and MET conditions compared to the abstract adjectives
(not easily experienced with the senses) in the AL condition.
If the concreteness of the adjective drives the processing and
interpretation of the noun phrase, then we expect to see an N400
concreteness effect at the noun such that CL expression, but also
the MET expressions, exhibit larger N400s than AL expressions
(CL = MET > AL). Conversely, if it is the abstractness of the
emergent concept to which the noun phrase refers rather than
the abstractness of the adjective per se that drives processing
and interpretation (such that the MET noun is processed as if it
followed an abstract adjective) then the MET and AL nouns would
elicit equivalently reduced N400 amplitudes (CL > MET = AL). If,
however, the system concurrently distinguishes between emergent
concreteness, and between abstract concepts that are literal vs.
those that are metaphorical, then the N400 to metaphors may be
even larger than the N400 for abstract expressions (MET > AL)
due to increased processing demands of understanding a novel
expression formed by an adjective referring to a physical trait that
a noun cannot literally possess. This outcome would converge
with the ERP metaphor literature, and with the differential
sensitivity of the N400 to independent factors of concreteness and
ease of processing/expectancy.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
STIMULI
To create the two-word expressions used in the ERP study,
each of 212 nouns was combined with 3 different adjectives
to form 636 novel word pairs. The nouns were polysemous in
that metaphorical (MET), concrete literal (CL) or abstract literal
(AL) expressions could result from modification by the different
adjectives. Examples of the stimuli can be seen in Table 1.
The AL word pairs consisted of abstract adjectives modifying
nouns to form expressions referring to abstract concepts. In
the CL and MET conditions, adjectives were concrete, but
in the MET condition adjectives modified nouns in a non-
literal manner: 43% of the adjectives were shared across
these two conditions. CL expressions referred to entities easily
experienced by the senses, whereas AL and MET expressions
referred to entities not easily experienced with the senses.
Word pairs were designed to be meaningful but novel, with
novelty controlled for by corpus measures. All word pairs
appeared 4 times or less in the BNC and the probability of
a noun following an adjective was less than 0.01. Semantic
relatedness between constituents of expressions was low, as
measured by Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA) (M = 0.11,
SD = 0.11).
To ensure that stimuli were consistent with the definitions
above, all word pairs were rated in an online norming study by
90 UCSD students not participating in the ERP study. Word pairs
were rated along three dimensions (concreteness, literalness, and
meaningfulness) on seven point Likert-scales: (1: not at all—
7: completely). The three tasks assigned randomly to individual
word pairs were: (1) “How easy is it to experience with the
senses?”; (2) “How literal is it?”; and (3) “How meaningful
is it?” We chose a literalness rating in order to avoid the
explanation or definition of “metaphorical” and/or “figurative”,
suspecting that it might be easier to determine whether something
is meant literally than figuratively. Each participant saw every
word pair but rated individual expressions along only one
dimension. Across participants, all word pairs were rated for all
dimensions. Pairs in which the CL expression was rated more
abstract than the AL expression, or for which the MET was
rated more literal than the CL or AL expressions, were excluded.
Of the 212 normed items, the two rated least meaningful were
discarded. Of the remaining 210 items, the half (105) rated most
meaningful (and most literal and most metaphorical for the
corresponding conditions) were used as stimuli, with the rest
assigned to be fillers. Item norming statistics are summarized
in Table 2. Using the same target nouns in each condition
ensured that noun lexical factors were identically matched (i.e., no
differences in terms of frequency, length or other psycholinguistic
measure).
A one-way ANOVA revealed significant differences between
conditions with respect to concreteness, F(2,312) = 162.3,
p < 0.001, η2P = 0.51, literalness, F(2,312) = 387.9, p < 0.001,
η2P = 0.71, and meaningfulness, F(2,312) = 114, p < 0.001, η
2
P =
0.42. Levene’s test of equality of error variances was significant
for concreteness, F(2,312) = 7.84, p < 0.001, and meaningfulness,
F(2,312) = 5.04, p < 0.01, and there was a strong trend for
literalness, F(2,312) = 3, p = 0.051. Therefore, the Tamhane
post hoc test was used for pairwise comparisons. All conditions
were significantly different from each other in concreteness
(p < 0.001), and literalness (p < 0.05), while in meaningfulness
AL and CL expressions were not significantly different, with only
MET differing from the other conditions (p< 0.001, although all
conditions were still above 4, the middle of the scale used).
Participants read each adjective-noun pair followed by a probe
word that was either related or unrelated to the two-word phrase.
Examples of stimuli and related probe words are shown in Table 3.
Table 2 | Means (standard deviations) of stimulus properties.
MET CL AL
Concreteness 3.46 (0.73) 4.89 (0.55) 3.85 (0.46)
Literalness 3.03 (0.58) 5.37 (0.72) 5.13 (0.7)
Meaningfulness 4.14 (0.74) 5.31 (0.64) 5.33 (0.56)
LSA 0.08 (0.09) 0.14 (0.13) 0.11 (0.09)
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Table 3 | Example stimuli and related probe words.
Condition Adjective Noun Probe
MET Fluffy Speech Exaggeration
CL Loud Meeting Dispute
CL Scary Movie Thrill
MET Velvety Lake Beauty
AL Unknown Path Hiking
CL Salty Earth Coast
CL Luxurious Party Tuxedo
MET Rusty Moves Sports
ERP PARTICIPANTS
Forty-two UCSD volunteers (18 females) participated for course
credit or were compensated at 7 h. Participants were right-
handed, native English speakers with normal or corrected-to-
normal vision, ranging from 18–29 years old (M = 21). Of the
42 participants, 7 were excluded from further analysis due to
excessive eye blink or movement artifacts, which left a remaining
35 participants whose data we continued to examine.
PROCEDURE
The experiment was conducted according to human subject
protocols approved by the University of California, San
Diego Institutional Review Board. All participants provided
their informed consent in writing before participating in
the experiment. ERPs were recorded in a single session in a
sound-attenuated, electrically shielded chamber. Participants
sat one meter in front of a CRT monitor and read adjective-
noun pairs followed by probe words. Participants used two
hand-held buttons to indicate whether the probe word (e.g.,
“leader”) was related to the adjective-noun pair (e.g., “respected
person”). Importantly, this technique encouraged participants to
comprehend the novel metaphorical expressions in a figurative
rather than a literal sense. Response hand was counterbalanced
across participants and lists. Stimuli were centrally presented
in white Arial 26 point font on a black background on a CRT
monitor. Participants completed 6 blocks of 35 items each with
short breaks between them. Each trial started with a blank screen
(1000 ms), followed by a fixation cross “+” (1000 ms). The
adjective appeared centrally for 200 ms, followed by a 300 ms
blank screen, followed by the noun for 200 ms, followed by a
1500 ms blank screen, and finally a probe word appeared for
200 ms. After 800 ms following the probe onset, a question mark
“?” was displayed until participants responded with a button
press. A small red dot was presented centrally and slightly below
the text throughout the trials, except during the question mark
and the first 1000 ms blank screen; participants were instructed
not to blink when it was present. Participants saw all 105 target
nouns once, and each was paired with a single adjective once,
resulting in 35 items from each condition, along with 105 filler
expressions. Items were arranged in 5 different lists to avoid order
effects. Each of the 5 lists was separated into 3 sublists so that
each noun was paired with all 3 adjectives across participants.
EEG RECORDING
The electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded from 26
electrodes arranged geodesically in an Electro-cap, each
referenced online to an electrode over the left mastoid. Blinks
and eye movements were monitored from electrodes placed on
the outer canthi and under each eye, also referenced to the left
mastoid. Electrode impedances were kept below 5 KΩ. The EEG
was amplified with Grass amplifiers with a band pass of 0.01–100
Hz and was continuously digitized at a sampling rate of 250
samples/second.
DATA ANALYSIS
Trials contaminated by eye movements, excessive muscle activity,
or amplifier blocking were rejected off-line before averaging:
these trials (8.3% for MET, 10.6% for CL, and 10.1% for AL) were
excluded from further analysis. Data were re-referenced off-line
to the algebraic mean of the left and right mastoids and averaged
for each experimental condition, time-locked to adjective onsets.
ERPs were computed for epochs extending from 500 ms pre- to
1500 ms post-adjective onset, using a pre-stimulus baseline of
500 ms. Since we were interested in the processing of the two
word adjective-noun expression, we baseline corrected only prior
to the adjective, practically treating the two-word combination as
one experimental unit.
ANOVAs were used to analyze mean amplitude ERPs over
6 medial central electrodes (MiCe, MiPa, RMCe, LMCe, LMFr,
RMFr) where concreteness effects in the N400 time window are
commonly observed: these were the same electrode sites over
which adjective concreteness effects were assessed to determine
inclusion in statistical analyses. Based on the literature, we
analyzed concreteness effects in the following time windows:
(1) an adjective N400 time window (300–500 ms post-adjective
onset); and (2) a noun N400 time window (300–500 ms post-
noun onset).
RESULTS
BEHAVIORAL RESULTS
Overall response accuracy (M = 88%, SD = 6%) for button presses
indicating whether or not the probe was related to the word pair
suggested that the word pairs were read for comprehension.
ERP RESULTS
Average ERPs for all 35 participants are shown in Figure 1.
Adjective N400 (300–500 ms post-adjective onset)
An ANOVA with 3 levels of word type and 6 levels of electrode
location revealed a main effect of word type, F(2,68) = 10.65,
p < 0.001, with CL and MET adjectives showing greater
N400 mean amplitude (−1.78 µV and −2 µV, respectively)
than AL adjectives (−0.67 µV). Planned pairwise comparisons
indicated that the mean amplitudes for CL and AL adjectives
and for MET and AL adjectives were significantly different
(p< 0.001).
Our AL and CL conditions were based on adjective-noun pair
concreteness ratings. However, to ensure that these labels also
matched the concreteness of the adjectives alone, we obtained
concreteness ratings for adjectives in the CL and AL conditions
from Brysbaert et al. (2013). For 46 items not found in the
database, concreteness ratings were collected from 7 UCSD
undergrad students who did not participate in the ERP study.
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FIGURE 1 | The left and right panels show six central scalp
electrodes from which ERP data were recorded and statistically
analyzed (locations indicated with an X on the schematic array of
26 scalp electrodes). In the left half of the figure are grand average
ERPs (N = 35) for the 3 experimental conditions. On the right half of
the figure are grand average ERPs (N = 35) again for the MET
condition, now contrasted with the lower half of the expression
concreteness ratings (from the AL condition) and the top half of the
expression concreteness ratings (from the CL condition). Target noun
onset occurs 500 ms following adjective onset.
Adjectives were sorted into high and low concreteness conditions
using a median split. An ANOVA with 2 levels of word type (high
and low concreteness adjectives) and 6 levels of electrode location
revealed a main effect of word type, F(1,34) = 15.59, p < 0.001,
with high concreteness adjectives eliciting a greater negativity
(mean amplitude = −1.73 µV) than low concreteness adjectives
(−0.62 µV). As these results were nearly identical to the results
for our labeled conditions, we assume that the difference between
AL and CL adjectives indeed reflects lexical concreteness.
Noun N400 (800–1000 ms post-adjective onset)
A concreteness effect in the expected direction is visible, with
nouns in the CL condition eliciting a larger N400 than AL nouns.
MET nouns appear to be patterning with CL nouns, also eliciting
a larger N400 relative to AL nouns. However, an ANOVA with
3 levels of word type and 6 levels of electrode location showed
no main effect of word type, F(2,68) = 1.24, p = 0.3. In order
to increase the sensitivity of the concreteness manipulation, we
sorted the data based on paired concreteness ratings into the most
concrete and least concrete items within conditions. The most
concrete (top half of CL) and least concrete (bottom half of AL)
items were compared to MET items in order obtain a clearer
pattern of concreteness effects—if they were indeed present in
the data.
An ANOVA with 3 levels of word type (MET, CL-high, and
AL-low) and 6 levels of electrode location revealed a main effect
of word type, F(2,68) = 4.38, p < 0.05, with CL-high and MET
nouns showing greater mean N400 amplitude (−1.39 µV and
−1.17 µV, respectively) than AL-low nouns (mean amplitude =
−0.29 µV) (Figure 1). Pairwise comparisons indicated that the
difference between CL-high and AL-low nouns and MET and
AL-low nouns was statistically significant (p < 0.05 for both
comparisons). Thus the N400 pattern at the noun resembles that
at the adjective.
Like the median split of the CL and AL conditions, we split
MET items based on participant ratings of pair concreteness.
These two conditions, MET-high and MET-low, were analyzed
in order to better understand how metaphorical items may be
processed on the basis of their rated concreteness. An ANOVA
with 2 levels of word type (MET-high and MET-low) and 6 levels
of electrode revealed a significant main effect of word type, F(1,34)
= 5.98, p< 0.05: the MET-low group was associated with a larger
N400 mean amplitude (−1.62 µV) than the MET-high group
(−0.53µV). We next compared these two MET groups to the high
and low CL ERPs (Figure 2).
First, the high-concreteness MET group was compared to
the most abstract and most CL conditions described above.
An ANOVA with 3 levels of word type (MET-high, CL-high,
and AL-low) and 6 levels of electrode location revealed a main
effect of word type, F(2,68) = 3.18, p < 0.05, with MET-high
nouns showing a reduced N400 mean amplitude (−0.53 µV)
compared to CL-high nouns (−1.39 µV). Pairwise comparisons
showed that the difference between MET-high and CL-high
nouns was borderline significant (p = 0.08) and there was
no statistical difference between MET-high and AL-low nouns
(p = 0.58).
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FIGURE 2 | The upper panels show ERP data at a representative midline
central electrode (MiCe, aka Cz). The adjective N400 (300–500 ms) and
noun N400 (800–1000 ms) time windows are indicated with shading. On the
left, the ERPs associated with the low concreteness-rated MET expressions
are contrasted with the lower half of the literal expression concreteness
ratings (from AL) and the higher half of the literal expression concreteness
ratings (from CL); on the right is the same comparison for the ERPs
associated with the high concreteness-rated MET expressions. In the lower
panel are N400 mean amplitudes (from the data in the upper panels) averaged
across the 6 central channels indicated in Figure 1. Error bars indicate SEM.
Second, the low-concreteness MET group was compared to
the most abstract and most CL conditions described above. An
ANOVA with 3 levels of word type (MET-low, CL-high, and AL-
low) and 6 levels of electrode location revealed a main effect of
word type, F(2,28) = 4.10, p< 0.05, with MET-low nouns showing
increased N400 mean amplitude (−1.62 µV) compared to AL-
low nouns (−0.29 µV). Pairwise comparisons showed that the
difference between MET-low and AL-low nouns was statistically
significant (p < 0.05) and there was no statistical difference
between MET-low and CL-high nouns (p = 0.66).
To ensure that the observed differences at the noun are not
merely spillover from the adjectives, we conducted three ANOVAs
as above in the adjective N400 time window (300–500 ms
post-adjective onset). Comparing MET (−2.01 µV), CL-high
(−2.35 µV), and AL-low (−0.8 µV) revealed a main effect
of word type, F(2,68) = 8.73, p < 0.001, with a significant
difference between AL-low and both CL-high (p < 0.001) and
MET (p < 0.01). The ANOVA including MET-high (−1.71 µV),
CL-high and AL-low also showed a main effect of word type,
F(2,68) = 6.98, p < 0.01, where only MET-high was different
compared to AL-low (p < 0.05). The ANOVA with MET-low
(−2.32 µV), CL-high, and AL-low likewise revealed a main effect
of word type, F(2,68) = 7.64, p < 0.01, where only MET-low was
different from AL-low (p < 0.01). In sum, while the pattern of
N400 effects at the noun mimicked that at the adjective in the
(high vs. low) literal conditions, this was not the case for the
high vs. low MET conditions, which reversed their direction from
adjective to noun.
DISCUSSION
In the current study we examined the real-time processing
of novel metaphorical (“sticky meeting”), AL (“constructive
meeting”), and CL (“loud meeting”) two-word (adjective-
noun) expressions. We replicated the well-known N400 lexical
concreteness effect on the initial adjectives of the two word
expressions. A reliable concreteness effect also emerged for the
nouns of the literal expressions when the most CL expressions
were compared with the most AL expressions—despite the
absence of any difference in rated lexical noun concreteness.
We also found that on average the N400 to the metaphorical
expressions patterned with that to the most CL expressions rather
than with that to the most AL expressions, contrary to what we
expected. Upon dividing the metaphorical expressions into more
concrete vs. more abstract subgroups based on pair concreteness
ratings we found that, paradoxically, the more abstract subgroup
of metaphors were associated with a larger N400 than not only
the most AL expressions but also the more concrete metaphor
expressions.
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The N400 concreteness effect on the prenominal adjectives
resembles that reported for single words (Huang et al., 2010;
Rabovsky et al., 2012; Amsel and Cree, 2013; Barber et al.,
2013). This finding has been hypothesized to reflect activation
of a richer network of semantic representations (or greater
activation within a given network) during the processing of
concrete vs. less concrete words. Within the literal expressions
split by pairwise concreteness, target nouns elicited a prolonged
negativity starting in the N400 time window that varied in
amplitude with the rated concreteness of the expression. Huang
et al. (2010) had showed that modifying a noun in a more concrete
vs. more abstract manner can lead to a concreteness effect
(e.g., for “book” in “interesting book” vs. “thick book”). Like
Huang et al. (2010), we find that for literal (non-metaphorical)
expressions, the concreteness of an adjective seems to determine
the concreteness effect on a subsequent noun, at least at the
extremes (the direction of their effect cannot be directly compared
with ours as they employed visual half field presentation and a
different task, among other differences). This manifestation of
the concreteness effect at the noun is particularly striking given
that the nouns themselves do not differ on this very measure (of
concreteness).
Unlike some ERP studies (West and Holcomb, 2000; Huang
et al., 2010), we find no evidence that our concreteness
effects reflect imagery-related processes over and above the
processes that routinely influence N400 amplitude. Specifically,
our concreteness effects at neither the adjectives nor the
nouns of literal expressions exhibited more frontal and/or right
hemispheric distributions than the canonical N400 distribution
to written words. As we already noted, our N400 concreteness
effect at the adjective is consistent with a proposed richness
of the activated conceptual representations in a lexico-semantic
system (e.g., Holcomb et al., 1999; Barber et al., 2013). Following
the same logic, our concreteness effect for the concretely vs.
abstractly modified nouns could reflect the richness of the
emergent higher-level conceptual representation—at least for the
literal expressions. For example, reading “thick book” in order to
determine its relation to an upcoming probe word could activate
a richer network of features of the concrete concept BOOK
than “interesting book”. This possibility does not necessarily
implicate sensory/motor activations for the interpretation of the
CL expressions, as it could just as well reflect greater activation
within an amodal semantic system (Plaut and Shallice, 1993).
Our results for the literal expressions extend the results of single
word studies (e.g., Barber et al., 2013) and Paivio (2007) dual
coding theory insofar as they demonstrate that concreteness need
not be a strictly lexical property (i.e., pegged to single word
meanings), but an emergent property of higher-level concepts as
well.
For the metaphorical expressions, however, our N400 data
pattern diverges from that of our literal expressions, as well as
from Huang et al. (2010). When we compare the metaphor noun
N400s to the noun N400s of the most abstract and most CL
expressions, our data (at first glance) suggest that the concreteness
effect at the noun is driven by the lexical concreteness of the
adjective, as seems to be the case in the literal expressions
and in Huang et al. (2010). To the extent that concreteness
effects at the noun are merely an extension (spillover) of
the ERP concreteness effect at the adjective, this pattern
should remain unchanged for all metaphorical expressions.
However, when we divide our metaphorical expressions by
paired concreteness, the more concrete metaphors appeared
to be processed (i.e., looked) more like AL expressions, and
the more abstract metaphors looked more like CL expressions.
In other words, the elicited negativity is reversed within the
metaphorical expressions, with expressions rated as more abstract
eliciting larger noun N400s than those rated as more concrete.
If the negativity for metaphors observed in the N400 time
window were a concreteness effect proper, high concreteness
metaphors should have elicited a greater negativity than low
concreteness metaphors. Yet the more concrete a metaphor was
rated, the smaller the negativity it elicited. At a minimum,
this pattern of results demonstrates that the processing of
the nouns in the metaphorical expressions cannot be driven
strictly by either lexical concreteness or higher-level emergent
concreteness.
Of course, concreteness is only one of many factors known
to influence the ERP, and in particular the N400. Less literal
and more novel expressions have been shown to elicit larger
N400s. Target words in novel metaphors usually elicit larger
N400 amplitudes than target words in literal expressions (Coulson
and Van Petten, 2002, 2007; Arzouan et al., 2007; Lai et al.,
2009), and relative to conventional metaphors they elicit larger
negativities slightly later as well, post-N400 (Arzouan et al.,
2007; Lai et al., 2009). Contra this monotonic relationship, our
high concreteness metaphorical expression condition did not
elicit larger N400s than our AL condition, and strikingly, was
reduced in comparison with CL expressions (see Figure 2). Even
though their concreteness positively correlated with literalness
(r(105) = 0.59, p < 0.001) and the more abstract metaphorical
expressions did elicit a larger N400 than the more AL
expressions, they did not differ from the more CL expressions.
If the increased negativity for metaphors in comparison with
more AL expressions (Figure 1) were due to metaphoricity
per se, it should have manifest for all metaphors, but it did
not.
One reason why our results diverged in part from other
investigations of metaphorical language may be that our
expressions were matched on novelty across conditions, whereas
in the aforementioned studies only the novel metaphors were
unfamiliar. As a result, all three of our experimental conditions
may have invoked some additional constructive or integrative
processing (linked in previous reports to the post-N400, sustained
negativity). On this possibility, our finding of equivalent N400s
for more AL expressions and more concrete metaphorical
expressions (despite a lexical concreteness difference at the
adjectives) suggests that readers need not necessarily construct
the literal (i.e., physical) interpretation of a novel metaphorical
expression before understanding its figurative meaning. This
interpretation is consistent with parallel models of metaphor
comprehension (Glucksberg, 2003): the abstract, figurative
meaning of metaphors might be readily and directly available,
as also inferred by Blasko and Connine (1993). Our findings
argue against other models of serial processing of metaphors
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as well. For example, Giora (1997, 2003) proposed that the
comprehension of novel metaphors requires the rejection of
a salient, literal meaning before arriving at a non-salient
metaphorical meaning. If we assume that serial processing
would result in non-identical ERP responses, the lack of
differences between more concrete metaphors and more AL
word pairs does not support the serial processing assumption
(unless the latter have both a salient and a non-salient literal
meaning).
Moreover, our results indicate that figurative meaning need
not be directly derivative of the physical aspects of verbal
expressions, but rather may at times emerge abstractly at
least by the time window of the N400, a well-established
marker of semantic analysis. Consequently, our data might
pose a challenge to strong views of embodied cognition (e.g.,
Lakoff and Johnson, 1999). On a strong embodiment view,
sensorimotor source domains (e.g., physical sensation of warmth)
are activated in parallel with more abstract target domains, so
as to provide structure and semantic content for understanding
metaphorical expressions (as in “warm smile”). Gallese and
Lakoff (2005) propose that “grasping an idea” involves some
of the same motor activations as “grasping a banana”. In other
words, during conceptual integration both conceptual domains
should be active at the same time; if so, we expected to
see this reflected in a canonical N400 concreteness effect at
the noun. We did not. Among other possible interpretations,
the apparent absence of a processing difference between more
concrete metaphorical expressions and more AL expressions
at the noun could be taken to mean that by the time some
metaphorical meanings are constructed, physical aspects of
the words might no longer be playing a tangible role in
comprehension.
A cumulative conclusion thus far is that neither concreteness
nor metaphoricity per se, can fully account for the processing
differences among our novel literal and metaphorical expressions,
at least in the N400 time window. We can speculate about
what additional factor may be influencing our results. Among
metaphorical expressions, rated pair concreteness correlates
with meaningfulness, r(105) = 0.53, p < 0.001 (a phenomenon
observed also by Forgács et al., 2014). Thus, the greater N400
elicited by the less concrete metaphors could reflect the typical
inverse relationship between context-driven expectancy and
N400 amplitude, rather than processes specific either to lexical
concreteness, or to figurative meaning. Perhaps the metaphorical
expressions rated more concrete and more meaningful were more
likely to increase semantic expectancies for the upcoming noun.
Our finding that more meaningful and more concrete
metaphorical expressions seem to be processed like more AL
expressions fits nicely with a newly emerging picture of metaphor
comprehension. On this view, there is no empirical reason to
assume that processing of metaphors invokes special processes
that are not also required for comprehending literal language.
Indeed, despite long held assumptions about the special role of
the right hemisphere in figurative language, recent results suggest
that it does not play a privileged role in metaphor comprehension
after all (Rapp et al., 2004, 2007; Coulson and Van Petten, 2007;
Bohrn et al., 2012; Forgács et al., 2012, 2014). Likewise, there
is no support for the proposal that figurative meaning of novel
metaphorical expressions proceeds only after attempts at (salient)
literal meaning fail (Forgács et al., 2014).
Forgács (2014) has developed a novel theoretical framework
for metaphor comprehension—Abstract Conceptual Substitution
(ACS). According to this view, for an initial metaphorical
interpretation it might suffice to substitute the vehicle term
(“fluffy” in “fluffy speech”) with one of its abstract, non-
physical properties, prior to any systematic mapping, or structural
alignment, etc. This take on metaphor interpretation is closely
related to that of Sperber and Wilson (2008), and the lexical
pragmatic account of Wilson and Carston (2007), Carston (2010).
They propose that metaphors are part of a continuum of
loose language use (together with hyperbole and approximation,
for example), which are understood via the generation of
ad hoc concepts. For example, in the expression “fluffy speech”
the concept FLUFFY is transformed into FLUFFY*, which is
conceptually both broader and narrower (i.e., more general and
more specific at the same time), in ways left as yet unspecified,
than the original, encoded, lexical concept. Forgács specifies
this broadening/narrowing in terms of the abstract-concrete
dimension: FLUFFY* could broaden the lexical concept FLUFFY
by activating more of its abstract properties (e.g., superfluous,
cushy, etc.), but narrow the lexical concept by suppressing all of
its concrete/physical properties (e.g., physically protruding fluff,
textile, texture, etc.). This approach is similar to Glucksberg (2003)
category assertion view, but does not rely on the creation of
superordinate ad hoc categories or on the generation of ad hoc
concepts. Instead, it might suffice to conceptually substitute
the most relevant (i.e., contextually most activated) abstract
property for the vehicle term (“fluffy”), creating “superfluous,
cushy speech”. This is not merely a paraphrase, however, because
expressing superfluous with “fluffy” brings along with it several
cognitive consequences, such as deniability, negotiability, etc.,
much like indirect speech (cf. Pinker et al., 2008). The lack of
a concreteness effect at least for the more meaningful, more
concrete metaphorical expressions vs. the more AL expressions is
consistent with this abstract substitution view in that the system
seems to substitute abstract but not concrete properties for the
vehicle term in our novel metaphorical expressions.
To sum up, our results suggest that the concreteness effect does
not merely reflect the concreteness of individual words, but may
also be sensitive to the concreteness of higher-level conceptual
information. At least in the N400 time window, and seemingly
only for more meaningful, more concrete adjectival metaphors,
our findings suggest that metaphorical language may be processed
and presumably understood in an abstract manner, despite the
concrete nature of its constituent parts. In conclusion, it appears
that comprehending certain metaphorical expressions created
from physical concepts and words can be as readily grasped, and
as rapidly digested as AL expressions, although not strictly driven
by concreteness.
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